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I. INTRODUCTION 
As explained in Plaintiff-Appellant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center's ("Saint Alphonsus") brief-in-chief, the District Court erred in not 
recognizing that the provisions regarding payment of post-release medical costs for 
county inmate-patients under Idaho Code §20-605 were expressly incorporated into 
Idaho Code §20-612, the statute governing inmates (such as Patient) housed in the 
same county in which they are ordered to be held. Further, the District Court erred 
in finding that post-release costs for same-county inmate-patients were, instead, 
covered by Idaho's medical indigency program (Title 31, Chapter 35), a conclusion 
not supported by the express language of §§20-605 and -612 (as modified by 
amendments by the Legislature in 1994) or Idaho's medical indigency statutes. 
The response brief filed by Defendants-Respondents Ada County Sheriff Gary 
Raney, Ada County, and the Board of Ada County Commissioners (collectively, "Ada 
County") relies heavily on pre-amendment case authority (to wit, St. Alphonsus 
Reg'l Med. Ctr .• Ltd. v. Killeen and County of Bannock v. Pocatello, infra), while 
largely avoiding discussion of the actual amendments in 1994 and the effect thereof. 
In summary, Ada County's arguments in response fail for the following reasons. 
Ada County's reliance on the 1986 decision of County of Bannock v. Pocatello, 
infra, offers little to the resolution of this matter, other than generally establishing 
that §20-605 applies to out-of-county inmates, and §20-612 applies to in-county 
inmates. It does not, for obvious reasons, address the 1994 amendments regarding 
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medical costs associated with care provided to inmate-patients during and post-
custody. 
Ada County's argument that the 1994 amendments do not require payment 
for medical care for inmate-patients post-release fails, in that the 1994 amendments 
were directly in response to the harsh results of St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr .• Ltd. 
v. Killeen, infra. Specifically, Killeen cut off reimbursement after release, but 
required counties to pay amounts vastly in excess of the reduced rates afforded by 
Idaho's medical indigency program. The 1994 amendments reduced the 
reimbursement rates, but ensured that providers would be reimbursed for the 
provision of care to inmates released for the purpose of receiving additional medical 
care. 
Ada County's argument that the 1994 amendment to §20-612 was intended to 
"ensure that county commissioners furnish out-of-state inmates with medical 
care, even those inmates did not originate from the housing county" contradicts 
§20-612's application to same-county inmates. Moreover, it ignores the 1994 
amendment to §20-612, which expressly incorporated §20-605's provisions 
regarding medical care afforded to inmates, including the proviso that "[r]elease 
from an order pursuant to section 20-604, Idaho Code, for the purpose of a person 
receiving medical treatment shall not relieve the county of its obligation of 
paying the medical care expenses imposed in this section." 
Ada County's further argument that discussion of Idaho's medical 
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indigency laws is irrelevant to the determination of this matter also fails, given 
that both Ada County and the District Court pointed to Idaho's medical 
indigency program as the correct means for providers to secure reimbursement 
for care provided to post-release inmate-patients. In addition to the significant 
differences in procedure and eligibility requirements, nothing in §20-605, §20-
612, or Idaho's medical indigency statutes expressly contemplates the medical 
indigency program picking up the costs of care for released inmate-patients, 
when specifically released from custody for medical care. 
Finally, Ada County's argument that §20-605's language is only intended 
to ensure that a responsible county pay for their own inmate-patient's medical 
care is contradicted by Ada County's argument that medical indigency should 
cover those costs. In that scenario, the precise result that Ada County is 
claiming should be avoided is not avoided. In the medical indigency program, 
counties are only responsible for an initial amount, after which the statewide 
Catastrophic Health Care Cost Program pays - thus, relieving the originating 
county of potentially most of the medical costs for the inmate's care. 
Accordingly, as Ada County's arguments fail to provide support for the 
District Court's summary judgment decision, as discussed further below, the 
District Court erred in its Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment, which decision should be reversed and the matter remanded 
to the District Court. 
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II. ARGUMENT 
A. County of Bannock is not determinative of the question posed by this 
case. 
Ada County's first responsive argument suffers the same pitfall as the 
District Court's decision - emphasizing the 1986 decision of County of Bannock v. 
Pocatello, 110 Idaho 292, 715 P.2d 962, but wholly ignoring the subsequent 1994 
amendments (following the Killeen decision) which modified both statutes. 
(Respondents' Brief at 8-10.) 
Without lengthy repetition, all that County of Bannock stands for, with 
respect to the question in this case, is that "LC. §§ 20-604, -605 and -606 are 
specific statutes which pertain only to the housing of prisoners in another county, 
while LC. § 20-612 applies to prisoners housed within the county." 110 Idaho at 
295. By no stretch does this answer the question in this case, as the 1994 
amendments changed the language of both statutes, and added the language that is 
now actually in dispute. Thus, in response to Ada County's challenge that "Saint 
Alphonsus offers no argument as to why the County of Bannock case is not 
controlling," the answer is simple: the statutes in dispute were amended in 1994, 
and that amended language (regarding medical costs and responsibility for costs 
post-release) was added in 1994. Other than the basic principle of §605 applying to 
out-of-county inmates, and §612 applying to in-county inmates, County of Bannock 
offers no additional guidance in this case, and is not determinative of the question 
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posed. 
Thus, Ada County's argument on this point fails and should be disregarded. 
B. Idaho Code §20-605 was amended, post-Killeen, to reimburse 
providers for medical bills post-release for conditions that arise in-
custody. 
Ada County goes on to argue that the 1994 amendment to §20-605 "did not 
expand this obligation to include future medical expenses incurred after detention 
or confinement ends." (Respondents' Brief at 11-12.) Ada County insists, then, that 
the amendment did not alter the holding of Killeen such that "a county is not liable 
for an inmate's medical expenses incurred after the inmate is no longer in custody." 
(Id. at 12.) Instead, Ada County suggests, that a reading of the current §20-605 
provides only that "the obligated county is still required to reimburse the housing 
county for those expenses already incurred while incarcerated." (Id.) However, 
quite to the contrary, the Legislature specifically amended §20-605 (and §20-612) to 
provide for reimbursement post-release, in direct response to the result in Killeen. 
First and foremost, any argument that the amendment to §20-605 was to 
ensure that providers were reimbursed for care provided while an inmate-patient 
was in custody is nonsensical, because the provider in Killeen was reimbursed for 
all in-custody care; that issue was not left unresolved after the appeal. St. 
Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Killeen, 124 Idaho 197, 199-200, 858 P.2d 736, 
738-740 (1993)("We are sympathetic to Ada County's policy arguments against 
being responsible for medical expenses-the anomaly being that when an indigent 
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is in jail, the hospital recovers more money than it would under the indigency 
scheme and the reality that the sheriff's office is not ordinarily so constituted to 
seek indemnity from other sources. Nonetheless, the statutes collectively indicate 
that it is ultimately the sheriff's responsibility to pay for prisoners' medical 
expenses. Re-allocation of that responsibility is within the province of the 
legislature.") What did remain open after the Killeen decision were two decisions 
impacting both parties: 1) the county was responsible for full reimbursement of the 
incurred medical expenses, but 2) only as long as the patient was actually in 
custody. 
And it is here that Ada County's argument unravels. Ada County's reliance 
on County of Bannock and Killeen - both decided prior to the 1994 amendments to 
§20-605 and §20-612 - illustrates the question that Ada County desperately wants 
to avoid answering - what, then, did the 1994 amendments do? As best as can be 
gleaned, Ada County contends that the amendment in 1994 to §20-605 obligated 
counties to reimburse providers for care provided to an in-custody patient - which 
providers were already entitled to, under Killeen and the pre-amendment statutes. 
With respect to §20-612, Ada County makes little discussion, offering a fleeting 
thought that the amendment to §20-612 was intended to ensure payment for out-of-
county inmates (while simultaneously arguing §20-612 only applies to same-county 
inmates). (Respondents' Brief at 13.) Indeed, Ada County even pretends that the 
amendment to §20-612 doesn't exist: "The legislature would not have inserted 
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this sentence into the middle of § 20-605 with the intent to have it apply in 
situations beyond the scope of § 20-605, at least without explicitly stating its 
intention to do so." The Legislature literally explicitly stated its intention to do 
so: "and medical care as provided in section 20-605, Idaho Code[.]" (amended 
language added to § 20-612 in 1994)(emphasis added). 
Instead, what Killeen and the subsequent 1994 amendments teach us is that 
the Legislature intended to address the harsh results (as to both sides) of Killeen. 
On the one side, Sheriffs were not entitled to the 'discount' on reimbursement costs 
that the medical indigency program afforded to non-inmates. On the other side, 
providers were stuck with costs for medical care that arose while an inmate was in 
a sheriffs custody but which abruptly ended when the inmate was released to 
receive additional care. As here, the patient in Killeen was in custody when a 
medical condition developed. R., 34 at if8 & 45-46 at if8; Killeen, 124 Idaho at 197 
("While in the Ada County jail, Edmonds experienced chest pains."). As here, the 
patient in Killeen was released from custody while still receiving care. R., 34 at if9; 
21, 46 at if9, 35-36 at if 13, 27-31, & 46-47 at if13; Killeen, 124 Idaho at 197 ("While 
remaining at St. Alphonsus for observation, she was released from the sheriff's 
custody on her own recognizance by magistrate's order."). 1 However, whereas in 
1 As was also the case in Judge Watkins decision in In the Matter of the Application 
on Behalf of Wade Gord, Jefferson County Case No. CV-2012-235. (R. 148-165.) 
There, the inmate-patient was released from custody "for the express purpose of 
receiving medical treatment" - to wit, a traumatic brain injury, from which he 
passed away a few days later. (R. 149 & 160.) Applying §20-605, Judge Watkins 
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Killeen the Court cut off reimbursement at the point of release, the Legislature saw 
fit to ensure that ongoing care was paid for when the inmate was released for 
medical care, but at a much lower cost for the Sheriff: 
• Idaho Code §20-605: 
In the absence of such agreement or order fixing the cost as provided in 
section 20-606, Idaho Code, the charge for each person confined or 
detained shall be the sum of thirty-five dollars ($35.00) per day, plus 
the actual cost of any medical or dental services paid at the unadjusted 
medicaid rate of reimbursement as provided in section 31-3502(4), 
Idaho Code, unless a rate of reimbursement is otherwise established by 
contract or agreement; . . . Release from an order pursuant to 
section 20-604, Idaho Code, for the purpose of a person receiving 
medical treatment shall not relieve the county of its obligation of 
paying the medical care expenses imposed in this section. 
• Idaho Code §20-612: 
It shall be the duty of the board of county commissioners to furnish all 
persons committed to the county jail with necessary food, clothing and 
bedding, and medical care as provided in section 20-605, Idaho Code, 
• Idaho Code §31-3302: 
(3) The expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons 
charged with or convicted of crime and committed therefor to the 
county jail. Provided that any medical expenses shall be paid at the 
unadjusted Medicaid rate of reimbursement as provided in section 31-
3502(4). Idaho Code. unless a rate of reimbursement is otherwise 
established by contract or agreement. 
held that "A county, wherein an individual is detained by law enforcement, is 
responsible for paying the costs of that confinement. Such is true even if the 
detainee is released for purposes of receiving medical treatment." (R. 160.) 
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(R., 146-147.) Thus, it is clear that, following the Killeen decision, the Legislature 
amended §20-605 and §20-612 to ensure that providers would be reimbursed (albeit 
at a lower rate) for inmate-patients that receive care after being released to receive 
care, to include inmate-patients housed in their own county. 
Accordingly, Ada County's argument on this point fails, and the District 
Court's decision should be reversed. 
C. Ada County mischaracterizes Saint Alphonsus' argument regarding 
§20-612. 
Ada County next reiterates its empty claim that "Saint Alphonsus concedes 
the ultimate issue in this case" - that §20-605 governs out-of-county inmates and 
§20-612 governs same-county inmates. (Respondents' Brief at 13.) Saint 
Alphonsus' argument does not end there, of course - §20-612, applicable to Patient, 
expressly incorporates §20-605: "It shall be the duty of the board of county 
commissioners to furnish all persons committed to the county jail with ... 
medical care as provided in section 20-605." Thus, the plain language of the 
incorporation from §20-605 into §20-612 is clear - whatever medical care 
prov1s10ns are in §20-605 are incorporated into §20-612, including the proviso 
that "[r]elease ... for the purpose of a person receiving medical treatment shall 
not relieve the county of its obligation of paying the medical care expenses 
imposed in this section." 
Faced with the incorporation problem, Ada County confusingly, and 
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awkwardly, argues that "[t]he inclusion of the §20-605 reference in §20-612 was 
necessary to ensure that county commissioners furnish out-of-state inmates with 
medical care, even those inmates did not originate from the housing county." 
(Respondents' Brief at 13.) Any contention by Ada County that §20-612 governs 
out-of-county inmates is meritless, given not only prior case law2 and the District 
Court's holding3, but Ada County's own summary judgment arguments: "The 
legislature certainly could have included the sentence in a different statute, for 
instance, in §20-612 (which the Supreme Court has held applies to prisoners held 
within the county)." (R. 67)(emphasis added). Moreover, Ada County's efforts to 
simply wave away §20-612 (and the 1994 amendment thereto) would otherwise 
be contrary to basic rules of statutory construction. Bonner County v. 
Cunningham, 156 Idaho 291, 295, 323 P.3d 1252, 1256 (2014)("[E]ffect must be 
given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, 
superfluous, or redundant."). 
Thus, Ada County's hollow argument, attempting to ignore Saint 
Alphonsus' argument regarding the incorporation plainly included in §20-612 
and the applicability of §20-612 to same-county inmate-patients such as Patient, 
can be quite safely be rejected by this Court. 
2 " ••• LC. §20-612 applies to prisoners housed within the county." Bannock County v. 
City of Pocatello, 110 Idaho 292, 295, 715 P.2d 962, 965 (1986.) 
3 "This is also mandated by section 20-612, which applies to prisoners housed within 
their own county." (R. 265.) 
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D. Discussion of Idaho's medical indigency laws is perfectly relevant, 
given both Ada County and the District Court's discussion of such in 
the underlying proceeding. 
Ada County goes on to argue that discussion of Idaho's medical indigency 
laws are irrelevant to the discussion of §20-612 and payment of medical costs for 
patient-inmates post-release. This argument can also be disregarded by this Court. 
Setting aside the fact that §20-605 expressly refers to and incorporates a 
portion of the medical indigency code (" ... the cost of any medical or dental services 
paid at the rate of reimbursement as provided in chapter 35, title 31, Idaho 
Code ... "), 4 both Ada County and the District Court pointed to the potential 
availability of medical indigency in defense of their interpretation of §20-605/612. 
(R., 60, 62, 68 (Ada County's opening summary judgment memo); 199, 210 (Ada 
County's summary judgment opposition brief); 255, 256 (Ada County's summary 
judgment reply); 266 (District Court's decision).) Indeed, Ada County was quick to 
point out - and essentially blame Saint Alphonsus for - the denial of medical 
indigency benefits for the Patient. (R., 255-256.) Likewise, the District Court 
expressly pointed to medical indigency as the remedy for indigent inmate-patients 
post-release: 
The sheriff and the county remain responsible for the payment to 
prisoner medical care, indigent or not, but only at the Medicaid rate. If 
an indigent prisoner is ordered to be confined in his or her own county, 
4 Indeed, as explained previously, that provision was added post-Killeen to address 
the fact that a hospital would recover more from a county for an in-custody inmate 
than it would otherwise recover under Idaho's medical indigency program. (Saint 
Alphonsus' Brief-in-Chief, at pp. 14-16.) 
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then that county will still be liable for an indigent prisoner's medical 
costs after release, but through the indigency statutes. 
(R. 266.) Thus, reliance on an argument predicated on the availability of medical 
indigency is critical to Ada County and the District Court. Otherwise, neither Ada 
County or the District Court would be able to justify a scenario where, as here, an 
inmate attempts to take his own life while in custody, and is thereafter immediately 
released from custody and left at Saint Alphonsus to provide care. Without being 
able to point to medical indigency, Ada County and the District Court would 
essentially be forced to advocate for the position that Saint Alphonsus should solely 
bear the entirety of medical bills for any inmate-patients the County elected to 
release, for good faith reasons or otherwise.5 
Ada County goes on to muse, in a foot note: "It is difficult to see why Saint 
Alphonsus would prefer that payment for a patient's medical bills originate from a 
specific source, as long as it received payment." (Respondent's Brief at 15.) Ada 
County's argument plays coy with the distinctions between payment by the Sheriff 
versus payment through the medical indigency system. Bluntly stated, the medical 
indigency system is a far more complex reimbursement system that frequently 
hinges on the cooperation of the patient for whom application has been made (a 
daunting problem being presented when the patient is deceased, comatose, 
5 Which is the actual outcome in this case. Here, the Patient was injured while in 
the custody of Ada County, but - in light of the denial of the medical indigency 
application - Ada County has foisted the entire cost of a suicidal inmate's post-
release care on Saint Alphonsus. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 15 
homeless, or otherwise uncooperative). For payment under §20-605/612 for post-
release patient-inmates, essentially two binary questions are posed: Was the 
patient who received medical care from the provider an inmate? Was the inmate 
released from custody for the purpose of receiving medical treatment? If both 
questions are "yes," then a provider can be reimbursed at the indigency rate. Idaho 
Code §§ 20-605 & -612. In contrast, for payment under the medical indigency 
program, compliance by both the provider and the patient is required under an 
extensive series of steps outlined in a slew of statutes, for which a misstep at any 
point can result in a denial of an application. Bases for denial of a medical 
indigency application can run the gamut from, for example: 
• Failure to submit the appropriate application based upon the care received -
31 days for emergency care, 10 days in advance for non-emergent care, and 
180 days for care for which a bona fide application has been submitted to 
another resource but denied. §31-3505. 
• Failure to submit (and have approved) a treatment plan for additional care 
not covered by the original application, submitted at least 10 days in advance 
of the additional care. §§31-3504 & -3505. 
• Failure to complete the Combined Application for State and County Medical 
Assistance, a 13-page document requiring detailed information about the care 
received, the patient's person information (as well as that of their spouse and 
children, if any), residence history, all current public assistance being used, 
health insurance history, criminal history, civil settlements/judgments, child 
support, income, expenses, assets, a Patient Rights and Responsibilities Form 
requiring 30 initials and a signature, and a release requiring signature.6 
6 The current Combined Application form is publicly available at 
http://healthandwelfare.idaho.gov/Portals/O/Providers/Medicaid/CombinedApplicatio 
nENG.pdf, which this Court may take judicial notice of, as needed. 
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• Failure to attend an interview with the clerk. §31-3505A. 
• Failure to provided demand verification documentation regarding the 
application, including picture ID, social security card, immigration papers (if 
applicable), veterans' status papers (e.g., DD214, if applicable), 
documentation regarding any kind of income, federal and state tax returns, 
bank statements, proof as to public expenses, documentation regarding any 
kind of expenses (rent, heating, electricity, utilities, phone, car payments, 
child care, medications, loan payments, court-ordered fines, etc. etc.). 7 
• Failure of provider(s) to submit "all medical records," or to request an 
extension of time to submit records, within 10 days of a clerk's request for 
same. §31-3504. 
• Denial of part or all of the provided care based upon the opinion of a county-
retained "utilization management" expert that the care was not "necessary" 
pursuant to the definition provided by statute. §§31-3502(18), (28) & -3505A. 
• Denial of part or all of the provided care based upon the opinion of a CAT-
retained "utilization management" expert that the care was not "necessary" 
pursuant to the definition provided by statute. §§31-3519. 
• Having statutory "resources" (including imputed income) such as might pay 
the medical bill over a 5-year period. (§31-3502(25)). 
• Failing to provide material information related to the application 
(inadvertently or otherwise), which can also result in criminal charges and/or 
ineligibility for indigency program for nonemergent care for a 2-year period. 
(§31-3511). 
• For patients in bankruptcy proceedings, failure to secure a lift of the 
automatic stay in bankruptcy court, resulting from the statutory creation of a 
lien on patients' property at the time of filing an application. §31-3504(4); see 
generally, In re Johnson, 386 B.R. 272, 280 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2008). 
7 An outline of the initial interview documents demanded by counties is on page 12 
of the current application form. Additional extensive documents regarding the 
medical indigency program and aspects thereof is publicly available on the Idaho 
Association of Counties website at http://idcounties.org/documents/indigent-
services/, which, again, this Court may take judicial notice of, as needed. 
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Just in the last decade, this Court has issued a number of decisions where counties 
have been reversed for denying applications for unsupported reasons, including: 
• Claiming (erroneously) that an application was filed one day late, despite 
express statute setting out how to count days. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. 
Ctr. v. Gooding Cty., 159 Idaho 84, 85, 356 P.3d 377, 378 (2015). 
• Claiming (erroneously) that patients had to sign applications, despite 
application containing signature sections for third-party applications, as 
permitted by statute. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Elmore Cty., 158 
Idaho 648, 654, 350 P.3d 1025, 1031 (2015). 
• Claiming (erroneously) that a federal reimbursement program available to 
hospitals should be considered a patient resource, contrary to statute. St. 
Luke's Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Gooding 
Cty., 150 Idaho 484,488,248 P.3d 735, 739 (2011). 
• Claiming (erroneously) that providers lacked standing to file petitions for 
judicial review of adverse county board decisions, contrary to statute and 
long-standing case authority. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of 
Comm'rs of Ada Cty., 146 Idaho 753, 758, 203 P.3d 683, 688 (2009); Saint 
Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Ada Cty., 146 Idaho 862, 863, 204 P.3d 502, 503 
(2009). 
• Claiming (erroneously) that undocumented aliens were not "residents" for 
purposes of medical indigency, despite lack of statutory authority for such 
conclusion. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of 
Ada Cty., 146 Idaho 51, 54, 190 P.3d 870, 873 (2008); accord, Mercy Med. Ctr. 
v. Ada Cty., Bd. of Cty. Commissioners of Ada Cty., 146 Idaho 226, 229, 192 
P.3d 1050, 1053 (2008)(error conceded). 
• Claiming (erroneously) that provider could not submit resource dispute to 
statutory resource screening panel at Department of Health and Welfare, 
despite plain language of applicable statutes. Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Ada Cty., 
143 Idaho 899, 900, 155 P.3d 700, 701 (2007). 
• Claiming (erroneously) that county lacked sufficient information based upon 
patient's lack of cooperation, despite county's own failure to meet statutory 
duties to investigate and related failure to elicit information at hearing. 
Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 143 Idaho 808, 812, 153 P.3d 
1154, 1158 (2007). 
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Moreover, Ada County's suggestion that Saint Alphonsus can simply avail itself of 
"the indigency appellate scheme [ ] designed to rectify any deficiencies in a county 
board's decision" not only implicates potential appeals to District Courts and this 
Court, but also potentially a resource pre-litigation evaluation through the 
Department of Health and Welfare (§31-3551) and/or a three-member non-binding 
arbitration of disputes over medical necessity (§31-3505F). 
Thus, Ada County's suggestion that the medical indigency program is 
somehow a 1:1 substitute for payment under §§20-605/612 is disingenuous, at best -
as even exampled by this case. Again, here, where the in-custody portion of 
patients' care was paid by the county (R., 10 at 113), the post-release care was 
submitted through the medical indigency program and rejected, leaving Saint 
Alp hons us to bear the entire cost of post-release care for an inmate injured while in 
the custody of the Ada County Sheriff. Indeed, as a reminder, the medical 
indigency system is a program of last resort. LC. §31-3501(2). The Killeen case 
arose precisely because of that - the medical indigency system denied the 
application, asserting that responsibility fell on the Sheriff. St. Alphonsus Reg'l 
Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Killeen, 124 Idaho at 198 ("Specifically, Canyon County 
maintained that Edmonds' medical expenses were the Ada County sheriff's 
responsibility.") 
Accordingly, any such argument by Ada County on this point should be 
rejected, as the Legislature plainly did not contemplate use of the medical indigency 
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program for inmate-patients (in-custody and post-release) under §§20-605/612 or 
the medical indigency statutes, except for the very narrow purpose of establishing 
the reimbursement rate as set forth in §20-605. 
E. Ada County's argument that §20-605 is only intended to avoid having 
other counties pay a county's inmate medical bills is contradicted by 
its interpretation that would, in fact, mandate that other counties 
pay a county's inmate medical bills. 
Finally, Ada County argues that the necessity of §20-605 is clear, to "avoid 
shifting the costs related to the inmate to the taxpayers of the housing county[.]" 
(Respondent's Brief at 16-17.) This argument is, ultimately, simply an extension of 
Ada County's overarching argument that §20-605 only applies in cross-county 
housing scenarios (despite the reference and incorporation into §20-612)- otherwise 
addressed above. 
However, Ada County's argument on this point also suffers a logic failure. 
Ada County argues that the Legislature was merely trying to avoid imposing 
medical costs on a housing county and, instead, ensuring that the originating 
county pays them. Ada County's desired interpretation here - that inmates 
released for medical care reasons be thrust into Idaho's medical indigency system -
creates the precise scenario that Ada County claims the Legislature was trying to 
avoid: a county paying for another county's inmates' needed medical care. 
As explained in Saint Alphonsus' brief-in-chief, by insisting that medical 
indigency is the correct means of payment, medical costs for inmates released to 
receive medical care (as here, following the Patient's suicide attempt in the Ada 
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County jail) would ultimately be medical costs borne by all counties in Idaho, rather 
than the "originating" county. This is because under Chapter 35, an obligated 
county is only responsible for the first $11,000 in medical bills, and the statewide 
Catastrophic Health Care fund would otherwise be responsible for all costs 
exceeding $11,000. See LC. §31-3502(5), -3503, -3503A, -3517. Thus, Ada County's 
desired result creates the exact problem that Ada County asserts is avoided by its 
interpretation - inmate care would be paid only in part by the responsible county, 
with the remainder being paid for by the rest of the state. 
Accordingly, as resort to Idaho's medical indigency system is something 
plainly not contemplated in §31-3302, §20-605, and/or §20-612, the District Court's 
conclusion that Idaho's medical indigency system supplanted the counties' payment 
obligations for post-release inmate-patients is in error and should be reversed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the District Court's October 25, 2016 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment should 
be reversed and remanded to the District Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of September, 2017. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
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